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Abstract
By introducing Keynesian time preference, we reexamine the neo-
classical growth model with endogenous time preference. It is shown
that the existence, uniqueness, and stability of the steady state guar-
antee. When introduced by MIU, money is superneutral and the Fried-
man rule is optimal. Furthermore, the equilibrium real rate of return
is equal to the equilibrium rate of time preference and is the unique
xed point of the time preference function.
Keywords: Keynesian Time Preferences, Monetary Superneutral-
ity, the Friedman Rule
JEL Classication Numbers: E1 E52 O42
1 Introduction
In neoclassical economics, the rate of time preference is usually taken as an
exogenously given parameter, which equals the equilibrium real interest rate
in the long run. As a measure of the degree of patience, the rate captures
The auther wishes to thank Heng-fu Zou, Liutang Gong, and Yulei Luo for their
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agentstradeo¤s between consumption today and consumption in the future.
However, in reality it is easy to notice that people save more (consume less)
when the rate of return of the nancial assets is high, and consume more
(save less) with a lower rate of return. The observation implies that time
preferences of people are changing with the uctuations of the real interest
rate, even though the time attitude of people is relatively stable as a kind
of phychological characteristics or social habits. In his great work, Keynes
(1936) had talked about changes in the rate of time-discounting. He said
that it was convenient to suppose that expenditure on consumption is cet.
par. negatively sensitive to changes in the rate of interest, so that any rise in
the rate of interest would appreciably diminish consumption.       . Over
a long period substantial changes in the rate of interest probably tend to
modiy social habits considerably, thus a¤ecting the subjective propersity to
spendthough in which direction it would be hard to say, except in the light
of actual experience.
The literature have talked a lot about endogenous time prefences and their
macroeconomic e¤ects. By taking the rate of time preference as an increasing
and convex function of the level of current utility, Uzawa (1968) sets up an
innitely lived, representative agent model to replicate the Mundell-Tobin
e¤ect which tells that monetary growth raises savings and the capital stock.
Employing Uzawas endogenous time preference in small open economies,
Obstfeld (1981) further examines the long-run monetary non-superneutrality
and the e¤ects of macroeconomic policies, and Obstfeld (1982) shows that
the Laursen-Metzler e¤ect does not exist. Epstein and Hynes (1983) have
also investigated monetary superneutrality in Sidrauski (1967) model and
concluded that a higher rate of monetary expansion increases the steady-
state levels of consumption and capital stock, and reduces the steady-state
level of real balances. Gootzeit, Schneider and Smith (2002) show that a
permanent increase in government expenditure causes super-crowding-out
of consumption and lowers the steady-state capital stock. By modelling time
preference as an increasing function of real wealth, Kam (2005) has also reex-
amines the existence of the Tobin e¤ect. In an innitely lived, representative
agent model with the Becker and Mulligan (1997) endogenous time prefer-
ence which taking the rate of time preference as an increasing function of
the resources spent on imagining the future, Gong (2006) shows that an in-
crease of ination reduces the resources spent on imagining the future which
increases the rate of time preference and decreases the steady-state value of
capital stock. In order to investigate Stockmans (1981) conjecture, Wang
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and Zou (2011) have reexamined monetary non-superneutrality and the non-
optimality of the Friedman rule by taking the rate of time preference as a
strictly increasing and strictly convex function of the ination rate named
ination aversion. Comparing these models with the standard neoclassical
growth model with a constant rate of time preference, we know that in order
to ensure the saddle-point stability of the steady state, we have to impose ad-
ditional conditions. Furthermore, money is not superneutral in these models
with endogenous time preference generally speaking.
By modelling the rate of time preference as a strictly decreasing and
strictly convex function of the real rate of return of the nancial assets in a
neoclassical growth model, we draw di¤erent conclusions from the literature.
It is shown that the existence, uniqueness, and stability of the steady state
guarantee in the models withour and with money, and the steady-state rate
of return of nancial assets is the unique xed point of the time preference
function. And, when money is introduced, money is also superneutral and
the optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule in the sense of Sidrauski
(1967) and Friedman (1969). Therefore, the note o¤ers a useful extention of
the standard neoclassical growth model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we extend
the standard neoclassical growth model to a framework with Keynesian time
preference and examine the dynamics of the economy. In section 3, by intro-
ducing money into the model, we reexamine monetary superneutrality and
the optimality of the Friedman rule. The concluding remarks are in section
4.
2 The Neoclassical Growth Model without
Money
2.1 Keynesian Time Preference
In the continous-time framework, based on the idea of Keynes about the
relationship between the rate of time preference and the rate of return of the
nancial asst, we assume that the time preference rate t of the representative
agent is a strictly decreasing and stictly convex function of the real interest
rate rt, namely,
t = (rt); (1)
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which satises
0(rt) < 0; 00(rt) > 0; (0) = 0 > 0: (2)
Asumptions (1) and (2) show that the rate of time preference is en-
dogenously determined by the real rate of return of the nancial asset. The
higher the real rate of return, the more patience the individual has, but the
increase of the level of patience is at a decreasing rate. It is also assumed
that the time discount factor of the individual at time t depends not only on
the current real rate of return, but also on the entire path of the return rate
frvgtv=0. That is,
t =
Z t
v=0
(rv)dv: (3)
Then, the modelling strategy has generated a new state variable, namely, the
time discount factor t. Di¤erentiating t with respect to t in equation (3)
gives rise to the dynamic equation of the time discount factor, namely,

t = (rt): (4)
2.2 The Neoclassical Model without Money
In this section, we introduce Keynesian time preference into the standard
Ramsey-Cass-Koopman (Ramsey, 1928; Cass, 1965; Koopman, 1965) model.
The representative consumers problem is summerized as maximizingZ 1
t=0
u(ct)e
 tdt; (5)
subject to the ow constraint

at = rtat + wt   ct; a0 given, (6)
the dynamic equation of the time discount factor (4), and the no-Ponzi-game
condition
lim
t!1
at exp( 
Z t
v=0
rvdv) = 0: (7)
The Hamiltonian associated with this problem is
H = e tu(ct) + et[f(kt)  ct] + et(rt);
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where et and et are two present-valued multipliers associated with constraints
(6) and (4), representing the shadow values of capital and the time discount
rate, respectively. The optimality conditions include the FOCs1
e u0(c) = e; (8)
er =   e; (9)
e u(c) =  
e; (10)
and the transversality conditions.
Competition in the markets for capital and labor services gives r = f 0(k)
and w = f(k)   kf 0(k). Dene  = ee and  = ee as the current-valued
multipliers. Substituting these equations and the asset market clearing con-
dition a = k into the optimality conditions leads to the dynamic system that
we shall examine as follows:

c =   u
0(c)
u00(c)
[f 0(k)  (f 0(k))]; (11)

k = f(k)  c; (12)
together with the initial condition k0 and the TVC. Dene the steady state
(c; k) by setting

ct =

kt = 0. We obtain two algebraic equations as follows
f 0(k) = (f 0(k)); (13)
f(k) = c: (14)
It is easy to know the existence and uniqueness of the steady state from the
assumptions on time preference function (1) and (2), and the neoclassical
assumptions of the production function. To check the saddle-point stability
of the steady state, we linearize equations (11) and (12) around the steady
state calculated from equations (13) and (14)" 
c

k
#
=
"
0   u0(c)
u00(c)f
00
(k)[1  0(f 0(k)]
 1 f 0(k)
#
c  c
k   k

: (15)
1For notational simplicity, we will omit the time subscripts in the following mathemat-
ical presentations.
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The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is negative, i.e.,
det(J) =   u
0(c)
u00(c)
f
00
(k)[1  0(f 0(k))] < 0; (16)
which shows that one of the two eigenvalues is negative and the other one is
positive. Hence, the steady state is a saddle. Similar to the standard model
with a constant rate of time preference, as is hyperbolic, the linearized system
is conjugate to the original nonlinear system in a neighborhood of the steady
state.
Proposition 1 The existence, uniqueness, and stability of the steady state
in the neoclassical growth model with Keynesian time preference guarantee,
almost the same to the standard model with a constant rate of time preference.
From equation (13) and the equilibirum condition r = f 0(k), we have
r = (r): (17)
There exists a unique equilibrium real rate of return satisfying equation (17)
because of the monotonicity and convexity of the time preference function.
Proposition 2 The rate of time preference is equal to the real rate of return
in the steady state; furthermore, the equilibrium rate of return is the unique
xed point of the time preference function.
Proposition 2 does embody not only the original idea that the rate of
time preference determines the real rate of return of nancial assets, but
also Keynesidea of how the real interest rate a¤ecting the subjective time
preference in the long run.
3 The Neoclassical Monetary Growth Model
In this section, we introduce money into the model by MIU putting for-
ward by Sidrauski (1967). The optimization problem of the representative
consumer is maximizing
W =
Z 1
t=0
e tu(ct;mt)dt; (18)
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subject to the budegt constraint

at = rtkt + wt + t   ct   tmt; (19)
the dynamic equation of the discount factor (4), the wealth stock constraint
at = kt +mt; (20)
and the no-Ponzi-game condition
lim
t!1
at exp( 
Z t
v=0
rvdv) = 0; (21)
where ct ;mt; kt, and at are consumption, real money balances, physical cap-
ital stock, and total wealth, respectively; rt and wt are the real interest rate
and real wages; and t denotes lump-sum real money transfer payments.
The wealth stock constraint requires that the total wealth at be allocated
between capital kt and real balances mt. The instantaneous utility function
Ut = u(ct;mt) satises uc > 0; um > 0; ucc < 0; umm < 0; uccumm   u2cm > 0
and the Inada conditions. And we assume that both commodities are not
inferior2.
The corresponding Hamiltonian is
H = e tu(c;m) + e[rk + w + x  c  m] + e(r) + eq(k +m  a);
where e and e are two present-valued multipliers associated with constraints
(19) and (4), representing shadow values of the wealth stock and time dis-
count factor, respectively; eq is the Lagrangian multiplier attached to the stock
constraint (20), representing the marginal value of the nancial wealth.
The optimality conditions for a maximum are given by the FOCs
e uc(c;m) = e; (22)
e um(c;m) = (r + )e; (23)
e+ re = 0; (24)
e u(c;m) =
e: (25)
2It is not hard to prove that the normality of the two goods is equivalent to the following
two conditions, respectively, umm   ucmumuc < 0; uccumuc   ucm < 0.
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and the TVCs
lim
t!1
e ea = 0; lim
t!1
e e = 0: (26)
The behavior of the rm is also summarized by the two conditions on
marginal productivity
r = f 0(k); w = f(k)  kf 0(k): (27)
In order to examine macroeconomic equilibrium, we introduce the gov-
ernments behavior. It is assumed that the government maintains a constant
rate of monetary growth
_M
M
= ; (28)
and keeps its budget balanced
 =
_M
P
: (29)
Substituting equation (28) and m = M
P
into equation (29) results in  =
m. Taking the derivative of m = M
P
with respect to t, rearranging, and
substituting equtions (28) into it, we have
_m = (   )m:3 (30)
Equations (23) and (27) imply that:
um(c;m)
uc(c;m)
= (f 0(k) + ): (31)
From equation (31), we solve  as a function of c;m; and k, i.e., t =
(c; k;m). And it is easy to know that
c =
umcuc   uccum
u2c
> 0; m =
ummuc   ucmum
u2c
< 0; k =  f 00(k) > 0:
(32)
Putting t = (c; k;m) into equation (30) gives the dynamics of real money
balances
3We assume that the representative agent has perfect foresight, i.e., _PP =  .
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_m = (   (c; k;m))m: (33)
Equations (22), (24), (27), and (33) result in the dynamics of consumption
_c =   uc(c;m)
ucc(c;m)
[f 0(k)  (f 0(k))]  ucm(c;m)
ucc(c;m)
[   (c; k;m)]m: (34)
From equation (19), (20), (27) and (33), we have
_k = f(k)  c: (35)
Therefore, equations (33), (34) and (35) describe the whole dynamics of the
model together with the initial and transversality conditions.
The steady state (c; k;m) of the dynamic system is dened by _c = _k =
_m = 0. The resulting form of algebraic equations is
f 0(k) = (f 0(k)); (36)
f(k) = c; (37)
 = (c; k;m): (38)
Equation (36) gives the familiar modied golden-rule level of capital accu-
mulation, which shows that, in the steady state, the marginal product of
physical capital equals the subjective time preference rate; equation (37)
tells that the steady state level of production equals the steady state level of
consumption; and equation (38) shows that the steady state level of ination
is equal to the exogenously given rate of monetary growth.
Similar to the previous section, equation (36) determines uniquely the
steady state level of capital k and real interest rate r by the assumptions
on the time preference and production functions. Then equation (37) gives
the steady state level of consumption and equation (38) determines implicitly
the steady state level of real money balances. To examine the stibility of
the steady state, we linearize equations (33)-(35) around the steady state
(c; k;m)
24 _c_k
_m
35 =
24 ucmucc cm   ucuccf 00(1  0) + ucmucc km ucmucc mm 1 f 0(k) 0
 cm  km  mm
3524 c  ck   k
m m
35 :
(39)
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Dene the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system as J . It is not hard to
nd that
3Y
i=1
i = det(J) =
uc
ucc
f 00(k)mm
(1  0(f 0(k))) < 0; (40)
and
3X
i=1
i = tr(J) = f
0(k) +
(uccu

mm   u2mc)
 ucucc
> 0: (41)
Equation (40) implies that there exists one negative real eigenvalue or three
eigenvalues with negative real parts, and equation (41) shows that there
exists at least one eigenvalue with a positive real part. Hence there exists
an eigenvalue with a negative eigenvalue exactly and the steady state is a
saddle.
Proposition 3 In the neoclassical monetary growth model with Keynesian
time preference, the steady state exists uniquelly and is locally saddle-point
stable, similar to the original Sidrauski model.
In order to reinvestigate the macroeconomic e¤ects of the permanent
monetary policy, totally di¤erentiating equations (36)-(38) leads to a system
of linear equations as follows:24 0 (1  0(f 0(k)))f 00(k) 01  f 0(k) 0
c 

k 

m
3524 dcddk
d
dm
d
35 =
24 00
1
35 :
Applying Cramers rule results in
dc
d
= 0; (42)
dk
d
= 0; (43)
dm
d
=
1
m
< 0: (44)
Equations (42) and (43) give the result of monetary superneutrality in the
sense of Sidrauski (1967), i.e., a permanent increase of monetary growth
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has no e¤ect on the steady-state levels of consumption and capital in the
long run. Equation (44) shows that a positive monetary policy has negative
e¤ects on real money balances because of the increase of the opportunity cost
of holding money.
The superneutrality result has direct implications for the optimal rate of
monetary growth. To examine the optimality of the Friedman rule, we write
down the steady-state level of utility as follows:
W  =
Z 1
t=0
e (r
)tu(c;m)dt =
u(c;m)
(r)
: (45)
Taking the derivative of W  with respect to  in equation (45) yields
dW 
d
=
(uc
dc
d
+ um
dm
d
)r + uf 00(k)dk

d
r2
=
um
mr
: (46)
Because monetary growth does not a¤ect consumption in the steady state,
the steady-state utility is maximized by making real balances large enough
that their marginal utility equals zero. Setting dW

d
= u

m
mr
= 0 and remind-
ing equations (27), (31) and (38) lead to
(= ) =  (r)(=  r): (47)
Equation (47) gives the similar result of Friedmans rule for optimum quantity
of money, i.e., the optimal monetary growth rate is equal to the negative of
the time preference rate, or equivalently the nominal interest rate equals
zero, i(=  + r) = 0. Moreover, the equilibrium real interest rate equals
the equilibrium time preference rate in the long run and also is the unique
xed point of the time preference function. Hence, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 In the neoclassical monetary growth model with endogenous
time preference, money is superneutral in the sense of Sidrauski (1967), and
optimal monetary policy is Friedmans rule for optimum quantity of money.
Furthermore, the equlibrium interest rate is equal to the equilibrium time
preference rate and also the unique xed point of the time preference function.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this note, by introducing Keynesian time preference, we have reexamined
the neoclassical growth model. It is shown that the existence, uniqueness
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and stability of the steady state guarantee, almost the same to the original
neoclassical model. And, when money is introduced by money-in-utility,
money is superneutral in the long run and Friedmans rule for optimum
quantity of money holds. Furthermore, the equilibrium interest rate is equal
to the equilibrium time preference rate and is the unique xed point of the
time preference function.
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